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NOTES
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN INTRA-UNION AFFAIRS TO PROTECT
THE RIGHTS OF MEMBERS
Today labor unions are the bargaining arm of approximately seven-
teen million American workers,' which is about one-third of the total
number employed in the United States exclusive of those engaged in
the agricultural industries.2 As the bargaining arm of its members,
a union enters into a collective bargaining contract with an employer
to establish the terms of employment of its membership. Generally,
each collective bargaining contract contains "union security provi-
sions," so called because the provisions are designed to protect a
union's bargaining position. Many of these agreements provide for
"closed" or "union" shops. In a closed shop an employer is bound to
hire only workers affiliated with a union local; 3 in a union shop, an
employee is required to become a union member within a prescribed
time after the date of employment. 4 Under either type of agreement a
member must remain in good standing with his union, or the em-
ployer is obligated to dispense with his services.5
It is easy to see that under such agreements union membership
may, in many instances, be far from voluntary and that a union must
necessarily have a great deal of control over the economic lives of
its members if the purposes of the union are to be successfully at-
tained. Within such a system there is the constant danger of arbi-
trary and unfair discipline by a union which may ultimately deprive
a member of his livelihood or of other economic benefits.0 Thus, a
1. WoRLD ALMANAC 80 (Hansen ed. 1954).
2. Id. at 261.
3. 908 DEP'T LABOR BULL. 6 (1947).
4. 908 Id& at 10.
5. 61 STAT. 136, 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. & 158 (1952). Section 8(b) (2)
effectively outlaws the "closed" shop by making it an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee in violation of § 8(a) (3), which makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employ-
ment. Section 8(a) (3), however, affirnmatively protects the "union" shop by a
proviso that says:
[NJothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall
preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization
to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after
the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment....
6. Although most interference in intra-union affairs is judicial, recent legisla-
tion has, as a practical matter, indirectly limited the area of effective union
tribunal action on matters that are within the union's ju7isdiotion. The Taft-
Hartley Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discharge an
employee because the employee has been expelled from the union, unless theground of expulsion was the. employee's non-payment of dues or initation fee.
Since loss of union membership could not result i subsequent loss of employment(except in the cases of non-payment of dues or initiation fee), the union sanction
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member's legally enforceable rights within the union require atten-
tion in considering whether the law governing labor unions provides
a member with sufficient safeguards against arbitrary or unreasonable
union action.
Legally, labor unions have been classified as voluntary associations.
This theoretically puts labor unions in the same category as churches
and fraternal groups.7 Historically, the courts have been reluctant to
intervene in the internal affairs of such organizations. They have,
however, recognized the necessity of judicial intervention in intra-
union affairs to protect the rights of union members.8
Judicial intervention in union affairs to protect members' rights
has been predicated principally upon two theories. One is the contract
theory; by this theory joining the union creates a contract binding
the union and the joining member to adhere to the rights and duties
encompassed by the union constitution and by-laws.9 The other is
the property theory, whereby the courts purport to protect a mem-
ber's "property" rights in his union against certain types of arbitrary
interference., Although public policy has often been part of the
underlying reason why a court has found the existence of property
rights, some courts make explicit, as their primary reason for inter-
vention, the ground that the union action involved is repugnant to
public policy.",
Though the courts speak of the "property" and "contract" theories
as separate and distinct grounds for intervention, in practice the
two theories are generally found to be intertwined and co-existent in
of expelling a member becomes much less effective and the union's control over
its members is restricted accordingly.
Thus, the unions having union shop security provisions are faced with a
dilemma. Expulsion, which would not result in the member's discharge from
employment, would render the union security provision ineffective. On the other
hand, the failure to expel a member as provided by union by-laws would render
such laws a nullity. The only logical course open to the unions, since union
shops are coveted, is to confine disciplinary expulsion to cases where the member
is delinquent in his dues or initiation fee. Other offenses could be punished by
remedial sanctions within the union. See 61 STAT. 136 § 8(b) (2) (1947), 29 U.S.C.§158(b) (2) (1952); National Labor Relations Board v. Eclipse Lumber Co., 199
F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1952).
7. See Kovner, The Legal Protection of Civil Liberties Within Unions, [1948]
Wis. L. REv. 18; Note 58 HARv. L. REv. 448 (1945); 26 B.U.L. REV. 66 (1946).
8. Ibid.
9. Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931); Krause v. Sander, 66
Misc. 601, 122 N.Y. Supp. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Herman v. United Automobile,
Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers, 264 Wis. 562, 59 N.W.2d 475 (1953).
See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049,
1054 (1951).
10. Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Protective & Benevolent Union, 75 Cal. 308,
17 Pac. 217 (1888); cf. Heasley v. Operative Plasterers & Cement Finishers In-
ternational Ass'n., 324 Pa. 257, 188 Atl. 206 (1936). See Summers, Legal Limi-
tations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (1951.
11. Cameron v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees & Mov-
ing Picture Operators, 118 NJ. Eq. 11, 176 Atl. 692 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935); ef.
Ray v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 182 Wash. 39, 44 P.2d 787 (1935). See
also Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 At. 70 (1921).
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a given case. The courts give no reason for the commingling of.these
theories. The probable reason may be that in the great majority of
cases involving judicial intervention a member applies to a court of
equity to enjoin a union tribunal decision and, historically, property
rights must exist before equity jurisdiction will attach. If a property
right is involved it is most likely to be unjustly infringed by a union's
breach of either an express or implied contract with the member.
The courts, for the most part, have been extremely liberal in find-
ing property rights to exist, and only five cases have been discovered
where property rights have not been found present. 2 The courts
have found property rights to exist in a member's share of the as-
sets23 in insurance policies,", in death benefits,15 and in a member's
trade and in his union membership. 1 A court which goes so far as to
hold one has a property right in his union membership and in his
trade certainly will never refuse jurisdiction where an injustice is
found which threatens to invade those interests. Some equity courts,
however, do not seem to think it important to find property rights
present in these cases, and have predicated intervention solely upon
the union's breach of contract with the member. These courts felt
that membership in the association was a personal right, and this
right was sufficient to warrant judicial protection. 7
EXHAUSTION OF INTERNAL REMEDIES
The courts hold that within the membership contract with the
union there is an implied obligation by the member that, in case of
grievance with the union, he will exhaust all available intra-union
remedies established by the union constitution and by-laws before he
12. For the citations of these cases see Summers, Legal Limitations on Union
Discipline, 64 HAuv. L. RHv. 1049, 1052 n.11 (1951).
13 See Angrisani v Steam, 167 Misc. 798, 730, 3 N.Y.S.2d 698, 700 (Sup. Ct
1938). But see Rueb v. Rehder, 24 N.M. 534, 548, 174 Pac. 992, 996 (1918)(assets consisting of a Bible and gavel do not warrant interference).
14. Heasley v. Operative Plasterers & Cement Finishers International Ass'n.,
324 Pa. 257, 188 At]. 206 (1936).
15. Ibid.
16. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers v. Boyd, 245 Ala.
227, 16 So.2d 705 (1944) (property right found in a member's trade);
Lo Bianco v. Cushing, 117 N.J. Eq. 593, 177 AtI. 102 (Ch. 1935) (property
right found in both the member's trade and union membership). In these
cases, the member is involved in a specialized trade such as those common to the
building industry. In order to pursue his trade he must be a member of the
union and to be a member of the union he must fulfill all of the necessary quali-
fications peculiar to the trade. Therefore, union membership usually goes hand
in hand with the pursuance of a trade and the exclusion of the member from the
union will prevent him from continuing to ply his trade.
17. Dingwall v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Railway Employees, 4 Cal. App.
565, 88 Pac. 597 (1906) ; Polin v. Kaplin, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931). See
Pound, Interests in Pe'sonalty, 28 HARV. L. Rnv. 343 (1915); 80 U. OF PA. L. Rsv.
452, 453 (1932). The proposition that union membership is a "personal" right
should be compared with the holding that such membership is a "property" right.
See note 16 supra. In these cases, if the courts had attempted to find the exist-
ence of property rights they could easily have done so.
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will appeal to an equity court;18 an appeal will not be entertained
until this obligation is fulfilled.'9 The courts have failed to give
reasons why they will not entertain a member's appeal if he has not
exhausted his internal remedies. Superficially one might say that
the member is in court on the theory that the union has breached its
contract with him. One of the elements of the contract is his obli-
gation to exhaust his internal remedies before appealing to the courts.
If he fails to do this he is in breach of his contract, and normally a
plaintiff in substantial breach of a contract may not obtain judicial
relief. However, the implied obligation to exhaust internal reme-
dies appears to be only a peg on which to hang a rationale for the
exhaustion rule. The real question is: What is the basic reason for
the exhaustion rule? There are several possible reasons which seem
to have validity in explaining the rule.
It is likely that the rule of exhaustion as it applies to litigants be-
fore union tribunals is based on the same policy which requires ex-
haustion of remedies offered by an administrative tribunal.20 The
reasons given for the rule in the administrative law field are that
it provides for an efficient management and an orderly procedure by
a tribunal familiar with problems of a specialized nature,2 1 and that
failure to exhaust internal remedies in an administrative proceeding,
as in a union proceeding,22 renders the suit premature 3 because,
until there has been an exhaustion of remedies, no right has been
irrevocably violated. Another factor to consider is that historically
labor unions were classified as voluntary associations in whose in-
ternal affairs the courts are not inclined to intervene, and they would
naturally be reluctant to intervene in a union's affairs before it was
clear that a member had no other adequate remedy.
Where a member is expelled by a union he may choose one of two
courses of action if he wishes to litigate his cause. He may bring an
action for equitable reinstatement or an action at law for damages.
18. Lo Bianco v. Cushing. 117 N.J. Eq. 593, 177 Atl. 102 (Ch. 1935); Way v.
Patton, 241 P.2d 895 (Ore. 1952); see Dragwa v. Federal Labor Union, 136 N.J.
Eq. 172, 179, 41 A.2d 32, 36 (1945). See 27 OpE. L. Rnv. 248 (1948).
19. Nissen v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen
& Helpers, 229 Iowa 1028, 295 N.W. 858 (1941); Reubel v. Lewis, 182 Misc. 30,
43 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Sup. Ct. 1943). See Snay v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159, 164, 176 N.E.
791, 793 (1931). But ef. State ex rel. Alden v. Cook, 360 Mo. 252, 227 S.W. 729(1950) (The court reversed and remanded the circuit court decision requiring
that all remedies be exhausted because the circuit court had failed to determine
if the union remedies were adequate.).
20. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938). See
also DAvis, ADMINISATIVE LAW § 182 and § 182 n.1 (1951).
21. See note 20 supra. Cf. Way v. Patton, 241 P.2d 895 (Ore. 1952).
22. In Way v. Patton, supra note 21. the court, in considering an appeal from
a union tribunal decision, said that failure to exhaust internal remedies amounted
to prematurity of suit.
23. See note 20 supra.
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If he brings a law action, the rule of exhaustion does not apply."' It
is said that the right of a direct appeal in a law action exists inde-
pendently of exhausting internal remedies since the member has
abandoned his claim to membership,25 and a reversal of the tribunal
ruling would not afford full redress for the injury to the member's
property rights since there would be no restoration of membership
and its attendant benefits.26
Though the courts enunciate the exhaustion rule in broad terms,
there are many factual situations raising exceptions to it. The im-
plied obligation to exhaust internal remedies applies only if the con-
troversy presents a "social question" involving a member's relation-
ship with his union and not involving property rights.27 Thus, if the
subject in the controversy involves a property interest of a member,
and if the by-laws are silent on the subject of exhaustion, there is
no implied obligation and the remedies need not be exhausted.25
Where, however, there are express provisions in the constitution or
by-laws that a member must exhaust internal remedies, he must
exhaust these remedies whether the question involves "social" or
"property" rights,2 9 unless additional circumstances bring the mem-
ber within other exceptions to the exhaustion rule.
24. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Green, 210
Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923); International Printing Pressmen & Assistants'
Union v. Smith, 145 Tex. 399, 198 S.W.2d 729 (1946); McCantz v. Brotherhood
of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers, 13 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
This same exception would probably apply when a member's rights are arbi-
trarily invaded n a way other than expulsion, and the member sues for damages
rather than a restoration of the right. However, no cases involving such a situa-
tion have been found.
25. McCantz v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers, 13
S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); see Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers V.
Nalty, 7 F.2d 100, 101 (6th Cir. 1925).
26. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Green, 210
Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923).
27. The courts have failed to give reasons for this exception. Way v. Patton,
241 P2d 895 (Ore. 1952); see Dragwa v. Federal Labor Union, 136 N.J. Eq. 172,
179, 41 A.2d 32, 36 (Ch. 1945) ; Lo Bianco v. Cushing, 117 N.J. Eq. 593, 605, 177
Atl. 102, 105 (Ch. 1935). See 27 ORx. L. RIv. 248 (1948). The courts consider a
question "social" in nature when it does not involve property rights. Therefore,
any right of a member which is personal may be said to involve a "social" ques-
tion. Although some courts feel a member's interest in his union membership
and trade is a "property interest" (see note 16 supra), other courts feel that union
membership and a man's trade is a "personal" right (see note 17 supra). The
writer uses the word "feel" advisedly, considering the decisions in these cases
to be a result of the courts' personal attitude toward the problem.
28. Nissen v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen
& Helpers, 229 Iowa 1028, 295 N.W. 858 (1941); Shapiro v. Gehlman, 244 App.
Div. 238, 278 N.Y. Supp. 785 (1st Dep't 1935); see Lo Bianco v. Cushing, 117
NJT. Eq. 593, 605, 177 AtI. 102, 105 (Ch. 1935); Cameron v. International Alli-
ance of Theatrical Stage Employees & Moving Picture Operators, 118 N.J. Eq.11, 19, 176 At. 692, 696 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935).
29. Dragwa v. Federal Labor Union, 136 N.J. Eq. 172, 41 A.2d (Ch. 1945);
see Cameron v. International Alliance of Theatrical State Employees & Moving
Picture Operators, 118 N.J. Eq. 11, 19, 20, 176 Ati. 692, 696, 697, (Ct. Err. &
App. 1935).
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If there is a situation where it appears that an intra-union appeal
would be futile or result in a substantial denial of justice, then as
a practical matter all reasonable remedies available to the member
are in fact exhausted.0 Such a situation would exist where the union
officers are oppressive, precluding any possibility for a fair and un-
biased review,/ or where the charge against the member was slander-
ing the international president and the appeal of last resort would
be before the president. 3- Thus, notwithstanding an express pro-
vision requiring a member to exhaust his internal remedies, courts
have said that the remedies need not be exhausted where a property
right is present and an appeal to the union tribunal would be futile,
illusory or a substantial denial of justice2' It appears superfluous for
the courts in these cases to speak of property rights coupled with
futility of appeal since they probably would not require a member to
pursue a futile remedy even if no property rights existed. These cases,
however, are before equity courts and they may consider the presence
of a property right to be requisite for equity jurisdiction to attach.
It is said that excessive and unreasonable delay in the union's
appellate process will warrant a direct appeal to the courts when a
member's property rights are involved and the delay necessitated by
exhausting internal remedies would result in irreparable injury to
the member.A Although this exception is spoken of as one distinct
from the exception based upon futility of appeal, it is submitted that
this exception is merely a test applied by the courts in order to deter-
mine whether the cause will qualify for the futility exception. There-
fore, if delay is to be considered unreasonable it must indicate that
an appeal would be vain, futile or a substantial denial of justice.
Thus, delay incident to an appeal was considered unreasonable where
a member's only opportunity for redress within the union was by an
appeal to a convention which was supposed to meet biennially but
had not convened for eight years and was not scheduled to convene
in the foreseeable future. 3 It appears that the foreseeable delay was
30. In Browne v. Hibbets, 290 N.Y. 459, 49 N.E.2d 7113 (1943), the court
felt that a statement by a union official to the member that "we" can do nothing
further, justified the conclusion that all reasonable remedies were at an end. Id.
at 466, 49 N.E.2d at 717.
31. Robinson v. Nick, 235 Mo. App. 461, 136 S.W.2d 374 (1940).
32. Corregan v. Hay, 94 App. Div. 71, 87 N.Y. Supp. 956 (4th Dep't 1904).
33. See notes 30-32 supra.
34. Nissen v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen& Helpers, 229 Iowa 1028, 295 N.W. 858 (1941). Cf. Cameron v. International
Alliance of Stage Employees & Moving Picture Operators, 118 N.J. Eq. 11, 176
Atl. 692 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935). See Mulcahy v. Huddell, 272 Mass. 539, 172
N.E. 796 (1930) (mere delay alone is not enough). See Summers, Legal Limita-
tions on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. Rav. 1049, 1086 (1951).
35. Heasley v. Operative Plasterers & Cement Finishers International Ass'n,
324 Pa. 257, 188 AtI. 206 (1936). See also Lindahl v. Supreme Court I. 0. F., 100
Minn. 87, 110 N.W. 358 (1907) (three year delay before appeal could be had
made internal remedies inadequate and thus amounted to a denial of justice.).
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evidence that an appeal would be in vain because it was unlikely that
the appeal would ever be considered. On the other hand, the single
circumstance that the appeal board would not convene for a year
did not justify a direct appeal to the courts even though the member
under suspension would be unable to find work in the interim30 In
this case the date on which the appeal was to be considered was defi-
nite and it did not appear that the appeal would be futile or result in
a substantial denial of justice.
Perhaps the most sweeping exception to the exhaustion rule is that
internal remedies need not be exhausted where there is a void tri-
bunal proceeding. When a tribunal proceeding is void, its decision is
completely ineffective 7 and the courts analogize the proceeding to a
civil proceeding without jurisdiction over the subject matter or the
person of a litigation.3 8 In such civil actions, a person adversely af-
fected by the court proceeding may attack its jurisdiction collaterally
when there is a levy of execution under a judgment rendered without
jurisdiction23 By analogy, when a union divests a member of rights
by authority of a decision which is a nullity because rendered without
jurisidiction, the member may collaterally attack the tribunal's juris-
diction in the courts in an effort to reacquire the rights of which he
was deprived. The rationale for this exception to the exhaustion rule
is based upon a violation by the union of the member's contract with
the union. A member has not contracted to appeal within an associa-
tion from a decision rendered by the association, when he did not
contract that the association should have the power or authority to
render such a decision. 0
A union proceeding is deemed void: (1) when the union tribunal
lacked jurisdiction because of a failure to comply with the union
constitution and by-laws in assuming jurisdiction; and (2) when the
procedure was repugnant to the concepts of natural justice, "fair
play" or the by-law procedural provisions. Union proceedings have
been declared void for lack of jurisdiction when a member was sum-
marily dismissed although the by-laws called for a hearing,41 when a
member was tried twice for the same offense in contravention of the
36. Snay v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159, 176 N.E. 791 (1931).
37. Hall v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor, 24 Fed. 450 (E.D. Ark. 1885);
Abdon v. Wallace, 95 Ind. App. 604, 165 N.E. 68 (1929) ; Nissen v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen & Helpers, 229 Iowa 1028, 295
N .W. 858 (1941); Rueb v. Rehder, 24 N.M. 534, 174 Pac. 992 (1918); Gersh v.
Ross, 238 App. Div. 552, 265 N.Y. Supp. 459 (1st Dep't 1933). See BACON, BENE-FIT SOCIETIES AND LzrFE INSUiIANOE § 133 (1917).1
38. Hall v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor, 24 Fed. 450 (E.D. Ark. 1885).
See BACON, BENEI.'IT SociEEs AND Livs INSURNcs § 133 (1917).
39. See, e.g., People en ei. Sandnes v. Sheriff, 164 Misc. 355, 299 N.Y. Supp.
9 (Sup. Ct. 1937); see Miller v. Rowan, 251 Ill 344, 348, 96 N.E. 285, 287 (1911).
40. Rueb v. Rehder, 24 NM. 534, 547, 174 Pac. 992, 995 (1918).
41. Corregan v. Hay, 94 App. Div. 71, 87 N.Y. Supp. 956 (4th Dep't 1904);
Heasley v. Operative Plasterers & Cement Finishers International Ass'n, 324
Pa. 257, 188 Atl. 206 (1936).
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by-laws of the organization, 2 and when the conduct provoking the ex-
pulsion proceeding was not offensive to the union laws.43 A proceed-
ing has been held void due to unfair procedure when the member was
not given an impartial trial."4
The failure of a union tribunal to grant a member an adequate and
reasonable opportunity to defend himself is in violation of "fair play"
and natural justice. The void proceeding exception, therefore, has
been invoked when the by-laws were silent as to notice and hearing
of the accused member, and no notice or hearing was granted.45
Thus, it appears that a union tribunal must accord the member no-
tice and a hearing similar to the due process procedure required by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution,
notwithstanding the fact that a union tribunal is within the union
framework and can act only in respect to the members of its organi-
zation.'* This requirement is by no means a Constitutional right 7
because the determination of the rights of a member is made by a
group of individuals, not by a state or its agents; it is a requirement
of fairness and justice in the spirit of the common law. s
42. Rueb v. Rehder, 24 N.M. 534, 174 Pac. 992 (1918).
43. Lo Bianco v. Cushing, 117 N.J. Eq. 593, 177 AtI. 102 (Ch. 1935). In Polin
v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931), the by-law which the union claimed
the member breached was one providing for appeal within the organization. The
member brought charges against union officers directly to the court without a
previous tribunal action. In holding this conduct not within the scope of the
by-law, the court said:
[I]t is perfectly obvious that the section relates only to appeals from the
decisions of a lower tribunal within the association to a higher tribunal,
within the union. When the plaintiffs brought action against the officers of
the union, no decision of the association had then been rendered against
them; therefore, they could not take an appeal as provided by the section.
The purpose of the action was to procuie restoration to the treasury of
the union of moneys alleged to have been misappropriated by its officers.
It was the absolute right of plaintiffs to bring the suit....
Id. at 284, 177 N.E. at 835.
44. Bricklayers', Masons' & Plasterers' International Union v. Bowen, 278 Fed.
271 (S.D. Tex. 1922) (members of trial board had personal interest in inquiry);
Browne v. Hibbets, 25 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (trial board which sum-
marily removed member from union office was prejudiced).
45. Rodier v. Huddell, 232 App. Div. 531, 250 N.Y. Supp. 336 (1931); Brick-
layers', Plasterers' & Stonemasons' Union v. Bowen, 183 N.Y. Supp. 855 (Sup.
Ct. 1920), aff'd without opinion, 198 App. Div. 967, 189 N.Y. Supp. 938 (4th
Dep't 1921). But cf. Trainer v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Em-
ployees & Moving Picture Machine Operators, 353 Pa. 487, 46 A.2d 463 (1946).
46. Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 37 Cal. 2d 134, 231 P.2d 6 (1951)(The failure of the tribunal to allow the accused to be confronted with his ac-
cusers and subject them to cross examination was a denial of substanial justice.) ;
Rodier v. Huddell, 232 App. Div. 531, 250 N.Y. Supp. 336 (1931); Bricklayers',
Plasterers' & Stonemasons' Union v. Bowen, 183 N.Y. Supp. 855 (9up. Ct. 1920),
aff'd without opinion, 198 App. Div. 967, 189 N.Y. Supp. 938 (4th Dep't 1921).
47. Junkins v. Communication Workers of America, C.I.O., 263 S.W.2d 337
(Mo. 1954).
48. Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 37 Cal. 2d 134, 231 P.2d 6 (1951);
see Blek v. Kirkman, 148 Misc. 522, 523, 266 N.Y. Supp. 91, 92 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
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JUDICIAL CONTROL OF UNION ACTIVITIES
a. Intervention in union tribunal action
A dissatisfied member who has fulfilled the exhaustion require-
ments, either by appealing to the highest tribunal within the union
or by falling within one of the exceptions to the exhaustion rule, is
in a position to have an appeal granted for a judicial review of the
union tribunal proceedings.
The courts accept a case for review where there is a substantial
question whether the union tribunal has arbitrarily invaded a mem-
ber's contract" or property 0 rights, or if the tribunal has violated
the member's Constitutional rights.5 Unless the courts find an arbi-
trary invasion of one of these rights they will generally consider the
tribunal's decision to be binding because of its quasi-judicial nature.52
To test whether a union tribunal has arbitrarily encroached upon a
member's contract or property rights, the courts look to the basis of
the union's jurisdiction over the cause, 3 to the procedure at the dis-
ciplinary hearing" and to the evidence to determine whether it was
substantial enough to warrant the decision issued by the tribunal.2 Of
course, if a union tribunal acts without jurisdiction, no decision it
makes can be binding on a member. A decision rendered without
jurisdiction is void, as we saw above,55 and an attempt to enforce it
against a member is an arbitrary invasion of his rights.
There are several different situations which involve lack of juris-
diction by the union tribunal, and for clarity these should be dis-
tinguished. The first is where the union tribunal is acting completely
without a jurisdictional base; the second is where the union unreason-
49. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Green, 210
Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923); Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Protective & Benevolent
Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 Pac. 217 (1888); Gaestel v. Brotherhood of Painters, De-
corators & Paperhangers, 120 N.J. Eq. 358, 185 Atl. 36 (Ch. 1936).
50. Hall v. Morin, 293 S.W. 435 (Mo. App. 1927); see Dragwa v. Federal
Labor Union, 136 N.J. Eq. 172, 179, 41 A.2d 32, 36 (Ch. 1945) ; Heasley v. Opera-
tive Plasterers & Cement Finishers International Ass'n, 324 Pa. 257, 188 Atl.
206 (1936).
51. Dragwa v. Federal Labor Union, 136 N.J. Eq. 172, 41 A.2d 32 (Oh. 1945)
Corregan v. Hay, 94 App. Div. 71, 87 N.Y. Supp. 956 (4th Dep't 1904); see Otto
v. Journeymen Tailors' Protective & Benevolent Union, 75 Cal. 308, 314, 17 Pac.
217, 219 (1888).
52. The court in Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Protective & Benevolent Union,
75 Cal. 308, 17 Pac. 217 (1888), said that:
In the matter of expulsion, the society acts in a quasi judicial character,
and so far as it confines itself to the exercise of the powers vested in it, and
in good faith pursues the methods prescribed by its laws ... its sentence
is conclusive, like that of a judicial tribunal.
Id. at 314, 17 Pac. at 219.
53. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Green, 210
Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923); Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Protective & Benevolent
Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 Pac. 217 (1888).
54. See note 51 supra.
55. See, e.g., Wiggin v. Knights of Pythias, 31 Fed. 122 (W.D. Tenn. 1887).
56. See text at note 37 et seq., supra.
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ably interprets the constitution or by-law in a proceeding; the third
is where the union fails to give notice and hearing to the charged
member.
A union tribunal is acting completely without a jurisdictional base
when the cause over which they act is nowhere contained, expressly
or by implication, as a ground for action in the union constitution
and by-laws. The courts allow a union to base expulsion or discipline
of a member on two basic grounds: 1) any violation of the established
rules of the association that have been subscribed or assented to by
the member and that provide some form of discipline for such vio-
lation; and 2) conduct which violates the fundamental objects of the
association and which, if continued, would thwart those objects or
bring the association into disrespect. ' Both of these grounds appear
to be based upon contract. The first ground refers to expressed con-
tractual provisions where the penalty for violation of the provision
is designated and a member has contracted to give power of discipline
to the union in the event that he violates the provision.5 8 The second
ground indicates an implied contract whereby a member, upon join-
ing the union, owes an allegiance to the union not to interfere with
its purpose or bring it into disrespect. 0 A tribunal which assumes
jurisdiction to hear a cause that does not fall under either of these
categories will be acting without jurisdiction, and its decision will
be void.6 ,
An appellate tribunal, as well as a trial tribunal, must assume
jurisdiction in accordance with the constitution and by-laws. An
interesting problem involving the jurisdiction of an appellate tribunal
arose over the construction of a by-law provision requiring that an
appeal from the lower tribunal must be filed within thirty days. The
executive committee filed charges against a member; the member
was acquitted in the lower tribunal hearing. The committee took an
appeal from this decision after the thirty day limit had expired.
Despite the by-law, the appellate tribunal entertained the appeal,
without objection by the member, and found the member guilty. The
member then applied to a state court of equity to enjoin enforcement
of the appellate tribunal's disciplinary action. The executive com-
mittee, relying primarily on cases where an accused had waived notice
57. Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Protective & Benevolent Union, 75 Cal. 308,314, 17 Pac. 217, 219 (1888); Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 283, 177 N.E. 833,
834 (1931) (citing Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Protective and Benevolent Union,
supra).
58. Krause v. Sander, 66 Misc. 601, 122 N.Y. Supp. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
59. Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931).
60. See, e.g., notes 41-45 supra. These cases should be distinguished from
those involving a judicial review of the evidence to determine whether it was
substantial enough to warrant the decision rendered. The question in those cases
is not whether the tribunal had jurisdiction over the cause, but whether they had
properly determined a cause over which they had jurisdiction. See text at note
79, infra.
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of a hearing by failure to object, argued that the member, by his
failure to object to the late appeal, had waived the thirty day limi-
tation. The court said that if a member appears at a hearing with-
out notice it would be a waiver because the purpose of notice for a
hearing is to give the member time to prepare his defense, and ap-
pearance is a presumption of such preparation. The court held, how-
ever, that these cases were not applicable to the facts presented, since
they involved a different principle. They reasoned that the appellate
tribunal had jurisdiction to hear only those appeals perfected within
the thirty day time limit. The member, by failure to object, could not
confer jurisdiction on the tribunal, for this could only be done by the
entire membership in the form of an amendment to the union by-
laws.61
Closely related to the cases where a union acts completely without
a basis for jurisdiction are the cases where a union tribunal purports
to take jurisdiction by authority of the union constitution or by-laws,
but unreasonably interprets the constitution or by-law in the pro-
ceeding. It has been said that a member who agrees to accept disci-
pline for cause impliedly consents to union determination of whether
the cause exists.62 The consent is not operative, however, if the union
unreasonably construes a by-law in finding cause for discipline. There-
fore, a tribunal must act according to the reasonable meaning of their
by-laws in trying and disciplining a member or they will be acting
without jurisdiction. In general, any reasonable construction which
an association gives to its own constitution and by-laws will be con-
trolling unless it is clearly in derogation of personal or property
rights of a member.63 Thus, where a union may have unreasonably
interpreted a by-law, the interpretation is subject to judicial review.
A tribunal decision was held void because of an unreasonable con-
struction where a member was expelled for violation of a by-law pro-
vision making conduct which tended to injure a fellow member an
expellable offense. The conduct involved was the informing on a mem-
ber who violated an ordinance requiring all shops to be closed on
Sundays. The court interpreted the word "injury" to mean "the un-
lawful infringement or privation of rights," and ordered reinstate-
ment.64 An unreasonable construction was also set aside where the
by-laws provided that a life insurance policy obtained through the
association would be avoided if a member was six months delinquent
61. Gordon v. Tomei, 144 Pa. Super. 449, 19 A.2d 588 (1941). Contra: Bush
v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees & Moving Picture
Machine Operators, 55 Cal. App. 2d 357, 130 P.2d 788 (1942) (The by-law re-
quired that an appeal must be filed within 30 days; the court construed it to be
only a directive and not obligatory.).
62. See Krause v. Sander, 66 Misc. 601, 604, 122 N.Y. Supp. 54, 56 (Sup. Ct.
1910).
63. Callahan v. Order of Railway Conductors, 169 Wis. 43, 171 N.W. 653(1919).
64. Manning v. Klein, 1 Pa. Super. 210, 217 (1896).
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in his dues. Dues were assessed twice a year, the first period ending
in June, the second in December. The member died in October owing
four dollars for the first term. The organization tribunal ruled his
dues were six months in arrears and refused to grant the policy bene-
fits to his widow. The court overruled the tribunal decision on the
ground that the association cannot construe its rules in any way other
than their plain and unambiguous meaning.6  The court said:
They [the organization] cannot be permitted to interpret the
contract as they please, and become their own judges of what
they mean by the use of words employed that have either a
technical or well-defined signification, known of all men who use
the language.-
In this case there was obviously an unreasonable construction of the
by-law, and this construction was certainly in derogation of the
widow's property rights.
The third situation involving lack of jurisdiction is closely akin
to the requirement of a fair procedure. In disciplinary proceedings
involving property rights, the union must give the member notice,
hearing and an opportunity to defend in the tribunal proceeding,
notwithstanding the absence of such provisions in the union by-
laws.- By analogy to the jurisdictional requirements of the civil
courts, it can be said that the failure of a union to accord a member
these opportunities results in the union's failure to perform the pro-
cedural prerequisites for it to obtain jurisdiction over the person of
the member involved, even though the tribunal may have jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the controversy.es Thus, a summary re-
moval of one from his union office without trial has been held an un-
fair procedure, °' the same as a summary proceeding to discipline a
member for violation of the union rules and regulations." Similarly a
summary proceeding against a member for alleged violations of union
orders was held invalid although the union by-laws made no provision
for notice and hearing. The court said:
[TIhe law insures to every member of such an association a
fair trial, not only in accordance with the constitution and by-
65. Wiggin v. Knights of Pythias, 31 Fed. 122 (W.D. Tenn. 1887).
66. Id. at 124.
67. Bricklayers', Plasterers' & Stonemasons' Union v. Bowen, 183 N.Y. Supp.
855 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff'd without opinion, 198 App. Div. 967, 189 N.Y. Supp.
938 (4th Dep't 1921); see Blek v. Kirkman, 148 Misc. 522, 523, 266 N.Y. Supp.
91, 92 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
68. The courts, however, generally speak of notice and hearing as a procedural
rather than a jurisdictional problem. See, e.g., Bricklayers', Plasterers' & Stone-
masons' Union v. Bowen, 183 N.Y. Supp. 855 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff'd without
opinion, 198 App. Div. 967, 189 N.Y. Supp. 938 (4th Dep't 1921); Browne v.
Hibbets, 25 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Cotton Jammers' & Longshoremen's
Ass'n v. Taylor, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 367, 56 S.W. 553 (1900).
69. Browne v. Hibbets, 25 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
70. Bricklayers', Plasterers' & Stonemasons' Union v. Bowen, 183 N.Y. Supp.
855 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff'd without opinion, 198 App. Div. 967, 189 N.Y. Supp.
938 (4th Dep't 1921).
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laws of the association, but also with the demands of fair play,
which in the final analysis is the spirit of the law of the land.
[Italics added.] 1
This case exemplifies the critical scrutiny to which the courts subject
tribunal procedure in order to insure a fair trial for the member
in accordance with natural justice, notwithstanding an omission of
a provision for notice and hearing in the by-laws. 2 By the same
token, any by-law which assumes to dispense with notice and hearing
would be unreasonable and void.73
Once having acquired jurisdiction to hear the case, the tribunal
must proceed in compliance with the union constitution and by-laws.
Generally, substantial rather than strict compliance with the union
constitution and by-laws will suffice7" as long as. the proceeding is
consonant with the conception of due process and natural justice, 5
and gives the member notice, hearing and opportunity to defend. 70
Thus, a minor irregularity such as the council rather than an indi-
vidual member preferring charges would not upset the proceeding;"
but to allow the accuser to sit on the trial board is an irregularity
barring a fair trial.78 Interested parties other than the accuser have
also been held disqualified to sit on the trial board.79 It has further
71. Bricklayers', Plasterers' & Stonemasons' Union v. Bowen, 183 N.Y. Supp.
855 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff'd without opinion, 198 App. Div. 967, 189 N.Y. Supp. 938(4th Dep't 1921).
72. Bricklayers', Plasterers' & Stonemasons' Union v. Bowen, 183 N.Y. Supp.
855, 861 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff'd without opinion, 198 App. Div. 967, 189 N.Y. Supp.
938 (4th Dep't 1921). The by-laws were silent on the subject; the court said,
"The fact that no such restriction [notice and hearing] upon the power of the
executive board is . . . contained within the book does not relieve it from like
obligation of fair play." To the same effect is Cotton Jammers' & Longshoremen's
Ass n v. Taylor, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 367, 56 S.W. 553 (1900) ; Blek v. Kirkman, 148
Misc. 522, 523, 266 N.Y. Supp. 91, 92 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (by-laws specifically pro-
vided for summary expulsion).
73. Blek v. Kirkman, 148 Misc. 522, 523, 266 N.Y. Supp. 91, 92 (Sup. Ct.
1933). But of. People ex rel. Schults v. Love, 199 App. Div. 815, 192 N.Y. Supp.
354 (Ist Dep't 1922) (court sustained a by-law dispensing with notice and
hearing when passed upon by three-fourths of the membership where the evi-
dence was unquestionable and the circumstances required immediate action). Even
though a fair trial is imperative in labor union disciplinary proceedings, the
duty of a fair trial is generally not imposed on other voluntary associations such
as religious and fraternal organizations. See Kovner, The Legal Protection of
Civil Liberties Within Unions, [1948] WIs. L. RKV. 18 and n.1.
74. Davis v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees & Moving
Picture Machine Operators, 60 Cal. App. 2d 713, 141 P.2d 486 (1943); Dragwa
v. Federal Labor Union, 136 N.J. Eq. 172, 41 A.2d 32 (Ch. 1945) ; see Gaestel v.
Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers, 120 N.J. Eq. 358, 363, 185
At. 36, 38 (Ch. 1936); Callahan v. Order of Railway Conductors, 169 Wis. 43,
47, 171 N.W. 653, 654 (1919).
75. Davis v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees & Moving
Picture Machine Operators, 60 Cal. App. 2d 713, 141 P.2d 486 (1943); Dragwa
v. Federal Labor Union, 136 N.J. Eq. 172, 41 A.2d 32 (Ch. 1945).
76. Ibid.
77. Gaestle v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers, 120 N.J.
Eq. 358, 185 AtL. 36 (Ch. 1936).
78. Ibid. Cf. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers v. Boyd,
245 Ala. 227, 16 So.2d 705 (1944).
79. Bricklayers', Masons' & Plasterers' International Union v. Bowen, 278
Fed. 271 (S.D. Tex. 1922).
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been held that failure to object to an improperly selected board is not
a waiver of the right to have the board selected as prescribed by the
union constitution since
the formation of the trial body in accordance with the contract
rights of the accused member is not a mere matter of form or
procedure but is a substantive right of which he should not be
lightly deprived.111
Judicial scrutiny of the evidence to determine whether it is sub-
stantial enough to warrant the tribunal decision rendered is actually
no more than a branch of the requirement that the union give a
member a fair hearing in accordance with its by-laws. A finding
contrary to the evidence is clearly arbitrary action by the union, and
will not be binding on the courts. This is illustrated by the case in
which the union attempted to deny union insurance policy benefits to
a member's widow on the basis of their finding, contrary to the facts,
that the member was six months delinquent in his dues."'
Union tribunal procedure which violates a member's rights secured
to him by a state or the federal constitution or statute are, of course,
properly reversible by the court because of the violation alone, and
one does not have to look for lack of jurisdiction or other indicia of
arbitrariness. Thus, a construction of a by-law to proscribe conduct
which is properly within the ambit protected by the law of the
land has resulted in union action being set aside. In one instance a
union expelled a member for voting in favor of an opposing union in
an election held by the Railroad Labor Board to determine the bar-
gaining representative for the employees. The Board had the au-
thority to hold the election under the Transportation Act of 1920.82
The union's purpose was to obtain and hold agreements such as the
one voted upon. The by-law on which the expulsion was based pro-
vided that conduct detrimental to the purpose for which the union
was created is grounds for expulsion. The court held that the mem-
ber was under the duty to express his preference and had a legal
right to do so, hence there was no violation of the by-law.8 3 The court
80. Taylor v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Ass'n of Pacific Coast, 117 Cal. App.
2d 556, 560, 256 P.2d 595, 598 (1953) (hearing committee was to be- elected
by the membership). But cf. People ex rel. Schults v. Love, 199 App. Div. 815,
192 N.Y. Supp. 354 (1st Dep't 1922) (member's failure to object to an im-
properly selected tribunal was considered a waiver since the trial was before
the union as a whole and the only objection was that the tribunal consisted of
officers improperly elected).
81. Wiggin v. Knights of Pythias, 31 Fed. 122 (W.D. Tenn. 1887).
82. 41 STAT. 470 (1920).
83. Ray v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 182 Wash. 39, 44 P.2d 787 (1935);
cf. Abdon v. Wallace, 95 Ind. App. 604, 165 N.E. 68 (1932) (member testified
before I.C.C. in a manner unfavorable to union); Angrisani v. Steam, 167
Misc. 728, 3 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (member brought court action against
fraudulent union officials contra to resolution that he must first submit grievance
to union tribunal or be suspended); St. Louis S.W. Ry. of Tex. v. Thompson, 102
Tex. 89, 113 S.W. 144 (1908) (member testified against employer to the con-
sequent injury of the union).
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did not specify the right encroached upon; however, the author as-,
sumes that it was a right given by the Transportation Act in aid of
the duties of the Railroad Labor Board to promptly settle labor dis-
putes 14
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found it necessary to
declare totally unenforceable a by-law which provided for the ex-
pulsion of any member using his influence to defeat action taken by
the union legislative representative (lobbyist). 8, In this case the
member signed a petition asking the legislature to reconsider a "Full
Crew Law," the repeal of which would work a hardship on the union.
The court said that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides for refer-
endum and free speech; therefore, any by-law provision which com-
pels a citizen to forego this constitutionally inviolate right is un-
reasonable, and a tribunal decision under it is a nullity. The court
further held that the member cannot be said to have delegated these
rights to the union by virtue of the by-law provision.
b. Interference in non-tribunal union action
Union practice, other than tribunal proceedings, involving arbi-
trary discrimination against union members has also been subject
to judicial scrutiny. In one instance the local had a contract with
its members which purported to vest the local with control of all jobs
within its jurisdiction. The jobs were doled out arbitrarily to the
injury of many members. The court held the contract void as re-
pugnant to public policy since it established a labor monopoly, and
unconstitutional because it impeded the right of the member to con-
tract for his own labor, a right protected by the New Jersey Consti-
tution.B The New Jersey court similarly held a contract void as
against public policy where the local reserved, in their contracts with
the union members, the right to arbitrarily classify members as
"junior" and "senior."' sr
84. 41 STAT. 470 (1920). The Railroad Labor Board was replaced with the
Board of Mediation by the enactment of the Railway Labor Act, 44 STAT. 577
(1926). The Board of Mediation was later abolished by the establishnent of the
National Mediation Board. See 48 STAT. 1197 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 154 (1952).
85. Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Ati. 70 (1921). But of. Pfoh
v. Whitney, 62 N.E.2d 744 (Ohio App. 1945).
86. Walsche v. Sherlock, 110 N.J. Eq. 223, 159 Atl. 661 (Ch. 1932).
87. Cameron v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees & Mov-
ing Picture Operators, 118 NJ. Eq. 11, 176 At]. 692 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935); of.
Collins v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees & Moving Picture
Machine Operators, 119 N.J. Eq. 230, 182 Atl. 37 (Ch. 1935).
It is interesting to note that unions have the right to modify or abrogate a
member's seniority rights as long as the modification is done in good faith. Capra
v. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 102 Colo. 63. 76 P.2d
738 (1938); Ryan v. New York Central R.R., 267 Mich. 202, 255 N.W. 365
(1934). This right is based on the rationale that a member has no inherent
right to seniority since it arises out of a contract betwyeen the union and the
employer rather than with the individual members. This reasoning has pre-
vailed even when the effect of the modification was a member's loss of employ-
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In contrast to union discrimination against "members," is the
problem with which the courts are faced in dealing with union dis-
crimination against "membership." Theoretically, a union, being a
voluntary association and likened to fraternal and church groups,81
should have the power to determine its own qualifications for mem-
bership and should have the right to segregate its members into separ-
ate lodges. The Supreme Court of Kansas, however, felt that the
segregation of Negroes into another lodge, and a by-law provision
restraining the Negro members from any participation in bargaining
as prescribed under the Railway Labor Act gave proper grounds for
judicial intervention.", The court reasoned that a union may lawfully
segregate its members in wholly local activity, but segregation which
lends itself to inequality in affairs relating to matters of employment
is within the scope of the Railway Labor Act and the discriminatory
acts are affected with a public interest.40 In the Kansas case, the
court's decision rested on the ground that the collective bargaining
in question was affected with a public interest because it was within
the scope of the Railway Labor Act.
Even in the absence of a statute, the California Supreme Court held
collective bargaining to be affected with a public interest where there
is a labor monopoly created by a closed shop because the closed shop
precludes workers from obtaining employment unless they are union
members. The Court held a closed "union" to be incompatible with a
closed "shop,"' , saying:
Where a union has attained a monopoly of the supply of labor
by means of closed shop agreements and other forms of collec-
tive labor action, such a union occupies a quasi public position
similar to that of a public service business and it has certain
corresponding obligations. It may no longer claim the same
freedom from legal restraint enjoyed by golf clubs or fraternal
ment. See Hartley v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers,
Express & Station Employees, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938). In the
Hartley case, economic conditions forced the employer to reduce the number of
employees. An agreement was reached whereby married women were to be dis-
charged recardless of seniority rights. But ef. Nord v. Griffen, 86 F.2d 481(7th Cir. 1936), where the National Railroad Adjustment Board, a government
agency, awarded union members certain seniority rights to the detriment and
imminent loss of employment of a non-union employee. The court held that the
Board could not make such an award, saying that the right to earn a living is
a property right encompassed by the Fifth Amendment and enforced by the
courts.
88. See note 7 .spra.
89. Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).
90. Id. at 465, 169 P.2d at 837. In Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 223 U.S.
192 (1944), the union was designated as the exclusive bargaining agent under
the Railway Labor Act. The Supreme Court analogized the union's discrimina-
tion azainst Negroes to a state's denying a citizen equal protection of the laws,
and held that any union which has the exclusive bargaining power under the R.L.A.
must represent all employees equally, whether or not they are union members.
For a general discussion of leading cases on discrimination under the Railway
Labor Act see Comment, [1953] Wis. L. Rnv. 516.
91. James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944).
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organizations. Its asserted right to choose its own members
does not merely relate to social relations; it affects the funda-
mental right to work for a living. 2
In this case, the union had attempted to set up an auxiliary lodge
for Negroes under similar circumstances as did the union in the
Kansas case. On this issue the court held that failure to provide
the Negro lodge with privileges equal to those extended members
of the white lodge is in fact a complete denial of membership to the
Negro. The union could not exclude Negroes from membership
and it cannot do indirectly what it is precluded from doing directly.0 3
Although the "closed" shop in businesses engaged in interstate com-
merce is now outlawed by the Taft-Hartley Act," both the California
and Kansas cases are extremely significant in that these courts have
honestly faced the problem of handling unions as one distinct from
the problems created by voluntary associations. It is also likely that
the California court would treat a similar problem arising in a
"union"l shop in the same way.
A recent amendment to the Railway Labor Act" legalizing union
shops in organizations under the Act's jurisdiction may present a
similar problem to the one in the Kansas and California cases above.
No cases have been found presenting this problem but one may
predict that the federal courts will handle the question as did the
California court.9
CONCLUSION
Approximately eighty years ago, labor unions were a new phe-
nomenon on the American judicial scene. The courts, striving for
order within the existing juridical framework, classified unions as
voluntary associations and imposed upon them the rules of law gov-
erning such associations. One of the prominent features of the law
of voluntary associations is the hesitancy of the courts to intervene
in the internal affairs of such an organization.
In 1935, with the passing of the Wagner Act, unions began to
enjoy a tremendous growth in membership and in economic power.
Along with this growth in membership there has been a correlative
growth in the union's influence over the economic destiny of millions
of workers. In such a system, if not controlled by the courts, there is
the constant danger of arbitrary and unfair discipline by the union
against the member. Many courts, recognizing the need for judi-
cial control, have imposed the requirement of a fair trial in union
disciplinary proceedings, although such a trial is generally not nec-
92. James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal 2d 721, 731, 155 P.2d 329, 335 (1944).
93. Id. at 737, 155 P.2d at 
338.
94. See note 5 supra.
95. 64 STAT. 1238 (1951). For a discussion of the jurisdictional aspects of the
amendment see 5 LABoR L.J. 209 (1954).
96. See discussion in note 7 supra.
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essary in the disciplinary proceedings of fraternal and religious
organizations.9 Suffice it to say, these courts have taken cognizance
of the present labor situation and in so doing have found it nec-
essary to deviate from the basic tenets of the law of voluntary asso-
ciations, since the application of that body of law would often result
in a denial of justice.
It is to be remembered that the great bulk of cases involving judicial
intervention in internal union affairs are equity cases where the
courts are asked to enjoin or restrain certain union action. Thus,
the majority of the courts feel compelled to conform to the traditional
grounds for equity jurisdiction. However, the fact that equity will
not intervene in the absence of a threatened loss of a member's
property rights has not been a deterrent to judicial action in any
case where the facts manifest unfairness to the member.
The law as applied to labor organizations is not based on inflexible
legal rules; it has an elastic application to meet the exigencies of
each case. It is hardly an accurate statement today to say that labor
unions are governed by the law of voluntary associations. The law of
voluntary associations has been the historical starting point in a
body of law which today has grown into what may more accurately
be classified as the law of labor associations. Today, in the law of
labor associations, the law of voluntary association is merely a con-
ceptual starting point in the attempt to formulate a coherent body
of law to meet the perplexities of intra-union government.
CHARLES M. TUREEN
97. See discussion in note 73 supra.
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